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Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2015-1E-v1 
July 15, 2015, Revised: July 15, 2020 
Abstract 
Securitization is a process that allows banks and other lenders to package loans and sell them 
as bonds called asset-backed securities (ABS), removing them from their balance sheets and 
immediately generating cash for new loans. ABS are an important component of the 
financing cycle for many types of loans to households and small businesses, including 
mortgages. In the fall of 2008, financial markets began experiencing disturbances as the 
effects of the U.S. subprime market meltdown spread. The ABS market froze decreasing the 
volume of new loans to households and small businesses. The Federal Reserve became very 
concerned about the potential for these circumstances to further weaken the U.S. economy 
and, as a result, implemented the Term Asset-backed Loan Facility (TALF) to jumpstart the 
market and mitigate the negative effects on the economy. In this case we discuss the design, 
usage of the TALF, and its impact on the securitization markets during the crisis.  
________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is one of five produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability case modules considering 
the Federal Reserve’s credit and lending responses to the global financial crisis:  
 
• The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response A: Lending & Credit Programs for Depository 
Institutions.  
• The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response B: Lending & Credit Programs for Primary Dealers.  
• The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response C: Providing U.S. Dollars to Foreign Central Banks. 
• The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response D: Commercial Paper Market Facilities. 
• The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response D: The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility.  
 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
 
2 Director, The Global Financial Crisis Project and Senior Editor, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), 
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3 Janet L. Yellen Professor of Finance and Management, and YPFS Program Director, Yale School of Management.  






By 2008, asset-backed securities (ABS) had become an important element in the funding 
cycle for banks and other financial institutions providing a wide variety of loans to 
businesses and households. The consequences of the ABS markets freezing included: limited 
availability of credit to households and businesses of all sizes, an unprecedented widening 
of interest rate spreads, sharply contracting liquidity in the capital markets, and the potential 
to further weaken the U.S. economy. As a result, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) stepped in to 
provide support to this critical market and implemented the Term Asset-backed Loan 
Facility (TALF) in hopes of jumpstarting the market and mitigating the negative effects on 
the economy.  
This case discusses the design, usage, and impact of the TALF. The balance of this case is 
organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the critical role of the ABS market in 2008; Section 
3 describes the TALF in general, while Sections 4-6 discuss in more detail key provisions of 
the TALF; lastly Section 7 analyzes the usage and impact of the TALF.  
Questions  
1. Why was the TALF designed to provide funding to investors who purchased ABS 
rather than have the Fed purchase the ABS directly? 
2. It took four months after the TALF was announced for the first subscription to occur. 
What were some reasons for this delay? 
3. Why were the categories of TALF-eligible collateral repeatedly expanded? Were the 
different categories of collateral utilized as expected? 
4. Early in the program, the Fed announced that it was willing to undertake a significant 
expansion of the TALF from its original allocation of $200 billion to up to $1 trillion. 
However, only $71 billion was ever lent under the TALF. What were some reasons for 
the lower than expected levels of lending? 
5. Given the extra capacity under the TALF, were there other asset classes that the Fed 
should have considered approving?  
6. Do you agree or disagree with the issues raised by the Congressional Oversight Panel 
and with the points made by the Fed in response? 
7. What does the TALF say about the Fed’s role as central banker in an economy that is 
becoming less reliant on banks? 
2. Distress in the Asset Securitization Markets 
By 2008 securitization had become an important and integral part of the financial system. 
Traditionally, banks made loans to consumers and small businesses and maintained these 
loans on their balance sheets until maturity. Beginning in the 1990s, however, there was a 
steady increase in the incidence of selling these loans to third parties for cash that the banks 
then used to fund new loans. This process of securitization also had the benefit that assets 
could be removed from the balance sheet. Figure 1 diagrams a classic securitization process. 
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Figure 1: The Securitization Process 
 
Source: COP Report.  
Many types of consumer debt (e.g., credit cards, auto loans, student loans, and mortgages) 
and business loans (e.g., equipment and auto fleet leases) were treated in this manner. (See 
Figure 2.) Over time, securitization via ABS became a significant and key element in the 
business funding cycle for both banks and nonbanks, and many nonbanks, such as 
manufacturers of autos and heavy equipment, became important players in the credit 
markets assuming the lending function that had previously been performed by banks but 
with the intent of packaging and selling these obligations as ABS. (See Figure 3.) 
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Figure 2: U.S. Issuance of Securities Resulting from Securitization of Assets Other Than Real 
Estate-related Loans, 1990-Q1 2009 
 
Source: COP Report, 34. In addition, annual issuance of asset-backed securities resulting from the 
securitization of mortgage and real estate related loans exceeded $2 trillion from 2002-07, before the 
credit crunch took effect. 
Figure 3: Net Credit Intermediation by U.S. Commercial Banks and Issuers of Asset-Backed 
Securities (ABS) 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.” 
 
As the world savings glut expanded in the early 2000s investors sought out more safe assets, 
leading financial institutions to become more innovative and sophisticated in providing such 
assets. Because of the real estate and mortgage boom and the historical perception that U.S. 
real estate was a solid, low-risk investment, mortgages on U.S. properties became an 
increasing percentage of the securities underlying ABS. Growth of the subprime mortgage 
industry in mid-2000s, much of it conducted by nonbank finance companies, also flowed 
through to the ABS market.  
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When the subprime mortgage market began to sour, ABS prices fell as investors became 
concerned about all ABS, not just those composed of subprime mortgages. As the financial 
crisis deepened, financial institutions fled any security perceived as risky and this severely 
limited the sale of ABS. Institutions of all types, from banks to finance companies and 
nonfinancial corporations that were in the business of originating loans with the intent to 
securitize them, suddenly found themselves unable to sell such assets and were forced to 
maintain them on their balance sheets. This led to a contraction in their funding cycle as 
there was no new cash from selling ABS to support new loans. As a result, many institutions 
tightened credit requirements. One survey considered by the Fed shortly before announcing 
the TALF revealed that 60% of respondents had tightened lending standards on credit cards 
and consumer loans and that the percentage that had tightened lending standards on 
mortgages was even higher.5 
In the years leading up to the crisis, approximately 25% of consumer debt was securitized. 
Securitization was also an important element in funding loans to small businesses. By the fall 
of 2008, the securitization markets for consumer and business ABS were severely 
constricted, causing disruption in these markets and exacerbating the downturn in the 
economy. Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, which was 
in part driven by concern over its commercial real estate holdings, sales of commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which were responsible for approximately 20% of 
outstanding commercial real estate mortgages, came to a near complete halt (See Ashcraft et 
al. 2012).  
These developments were occurring as the interbank lending markets, notably commercial 
paper and overnight repo, were also experiencing increasing rates, haircuts, and tightening 
collateral demands, resulting in an overall contraction in liquidity. With the increasing 
pressures on financial institutions, the Fed feared a rash of fire sales of “illiquid” securities 
at depressed prices, which carried the additional risk of putting downward pressure on 
balance sheets of institutions compelled to mark to market other assets held. It was these 
concerns⎯that the crisis in the financial industry might spread to the real economy⎯that 
prompted the Fed to address particular impaired markets, including the ABS market. 
3. The Federal Reserve’s Response: The Term Asset-Backed Loan 
Facility 
The purpose of the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) was to jumpstart the market for 
new ABS given its critical role in the credit cycle and thus to stimulate the overall economy. 
The Fed relied on its emergency powers under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 
(FRA) to loan to any person, partnership, or business in “exigent and unusual circumstances.” 
(See Wiggins et al 2015, for a discussion of the Fed’s authority under FRA Section 13[3].) The 
Fed described the situation and purpose when announcing the facility:  
________________________________________________________________ 
5 “Moving to loans to households, almost 70 percent of respondents tightened standards on residential 
mortgages to prime borrowers . . . nearly 90 percent of the institutions that originated nontraditional 
mortgages tightened standards on such loans…. about 75 percent of the respondents tightened lending 
standards on home equity lines of credit, and about 60 percent tightened standards on both credit cards … and 
other consumer loans …. almost 25 percent of banks, on net, reported reducing the credit limits on existing 
credit card accounts of some prime customers over the past three months, and about 60 percent of banks 
reported cutting existing lines of some of their nonprime borrowers” (FOMC Trans. Oct. 28-29, 2008, 14). 
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New issuance of ABS declined precipitously in September and came to a halt in 
October. At the same time, interest rate spreads on AAA-rated tranches of ABS soared 
to levels well outside the range of historical experience, reflecting unusually high risk 
premiums. The ABS markets historically have funded a substantial share of consumer 
credit and SBA-guaranteed small business loans. Continued disruption of these 
markets could significantly limit the availability of credit to households and small 
businesses and thereby contribute to further weakening of U.S. economic activity. The 
TALF is designed to increase credit availability and support economic activity by 
facilitating renewed issuance of consumer and small business ABS at more normal 
interest rate spreads. (Fed. Res. PR Nov. 25, 2008)  
Under the TALF, the Fed committed to provide up to $200 billion of one-year loans to 
investors to purchase AAA-rated asset-backed securities (ABS) secured by newly and 
recently originated auto loans, credit card loans, student loans, and loans guaranteed by the 
Small Business Administration (SBA), but ABS backed by residential mortgages, such as 
subprime, were not eligible. The loans were to be fully collateralized by the ABS with haircuts 
applied and were to be non-recourse to the borrower. Originally funds were to be allocated 
through monthly auctions of preannounced amounts via sealed auction bid but ultimately 
the TALF operated as a standing facility lending at a rate set by the Fed. The loans were 
announced to be for a one-year term, but upon launch in March 2009, however, the term had 
been lengthened to three years. Later, a five-year loan would be added for certain collateral.  
The TALF was the best of a small number of possible remedies considered by the Fed staff 
for addressing the collapse of the ABS market (Ashcraft et al. 2012). Another option would 
have been for the Fed to provide direct funding from the discount window to nonbank 
finance companies, but this posed problems, including that the Fed had little experience in 
evaluating nonbank companies. The Fed also could have purchased loans directly from the 
issuers/originators, but again this carried risks and evaluation challenges that the Fed had 
little experience with.6 By requiring the issuers to proceed with the securitization process, 
the Fed relied on knowledgeable third parties whom the originators had to satisfy (investors 
and rating agencies, for example) to review the ABS.  
For several reasons the TALF was one of the more innovative facilities that the Fed 
implemented during the crisis. Its focus was on a particular market, ABS, the originators of 
which included banks, nonbanks, and nonfinancial companies, a wide variety of companies 
that the Fed did not regularly deal with and which it had no authority to lend to in normal 
circumstances.  
ABS are long-term assets and thus, to be effective, the loans were lengthened beyond the 
normal short-term maturities usually dealt with by the Fed. TALF assets would also enlarge 
the Fed’s balance sheet for years if the Fed held the assets to loan maturity.  
At the time, Chairman Bernanke noted that, “Relative to the Fed's short-term lending to 
financial institutions, the CPFF and the TALF are rather unconventional programs for a 
central bank to undertake. I see them as justified by the extraordinary circumstances in 
which we find ourselves and by the need for central bank lending practices to reflect the 
________________________________________________________________ 
6 It is instructive to compare the TALF’s design with that of two other Fed facilities used to combat the crisis: 
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual 
Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). Under the CPFF the Fed purchased eligible commercial paper directly from 
issuers, albeit through a SPV. With the AMLF, the Fed lent money to depository institutions to purchase eligible 
ABCP from eligible money market mutual funds, which ABCP the Fed used to secure the loans. (See Wiggins 
and Metrick 2016D for analysis of and the CPFF and AMLF.) 
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evolution of financial markets; after all, a few decades ago securitization markets barely 
existed. Notably, other central banks around the world have shown increasing interest in 
similar programs as they address the credit strains in their own countries. (Bernanke 2009) 
Given some of the particular challenges posed by the TALF, it took the Fed four months after 
announcement to work out the details and hold the first subscription. As noted above, in that 
time several of the key terms were altered. (See Appendix A for a timeline of TALF dates.) 
Also, on February 10, 2009, the Fed and the United States Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury Department) jointly announced the expansion of the TALF up to a potential $1 
trillion. However, as discussed below, utilization of the TALF would be limited, not even 
reaching the original $200 billion. Yet, it would be heralded as an important tool in the Fed’s 
arsenal against the financial crisis. 
4. The Structure and Mechanics of the TALF 
To implement the TALF, the Fed provided funds to the FRBNY to make loans to eligible 
investors who would buy eligible ABS and, as the list of eligible collateral expanded, CMBS. 
The loans were secured by the ABS and CMBS and were non-recourse to the borrower. Given 
the widespread nature of securitization practice and the various types of assets that were 
combined into ABS, the TALF permitted any U.S. company to borrow, as long as it met certain 
eligibility criteria, and could deliver the eligible collateral to support the loan. Each borrower 
was also required to establish an account with a TALF agent, usually a primary dealer, which 
would evaluate the borrower for eligibility and also provide certain administrative functions 
in the processing of the TALF loans. In this manner, because the Fed had limited experience 
with evaluating non-depository institutions, it relied on some of its existing administrative 
infrastructure in organizing the TALF.  
The Fed would hold the TALF collateral until the loan maturity, three or five years, or until 
otherwise paid off, at which time the collateral was redelivered to the borrower. Loans could 
be prepaid and the collateral returned to the borrower. The borrower could also surrender 
the collateral as pre-payment.  
Although originally announced to be an auction facility, TALF was quickly changed to be a 
standing facility with borrowers submitting subscriptions to buy at preannounced rates set 
by the Fed. As shown in Figure 4, TALF made fixed-rate or floating-rate loans. For each 
monthly subscription, the Fed established a fixed rate for each eligible collateral type, basis, 
and loan maturity, setting it as a spread over an index. The level of the index, but not the 













Figure 4: TALF Loan Rates 
Collateral type TALF Loan Rate 
Fixed-rate asset-backed securities (ABS)  
<One-year average life One-year Libor Swap rate + 100 basis points (bps) 
>=One-year average life Two-year Libor swap rat + 100 bps 
>=Two-year average life Three-year Libor swap rate + 100 bps 
SBA Development Company 
participation certificates  
 
Three-year TALF loan Three-year Libor swap rate + 50 bps 
Five-year TALF loan Five-year Libor swap rate + 50 bps 
Commercial mortgage-backed securities   
Three-year TALF loan Three-year Libor swap rate + 100 bps 
Five-Year TALF loan Five-year Libor swap rate + 100 bps 
Floating-rate  
Floating rate ABS One-month Libor + 100 bps 
FFELP loans One-month Libor + 50 bps 
SNA pool Certificates Federal funds target + 75 bps 
Private student loan Max (100bps, prime rate - 175 bps) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York: (Ashcraft et al. 2012). 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/12v18n3/1210ashc.pdf  
In addition to the haircuts that were applied, an administrative fee of 10 basis points of the 
loan amount was applied to loans secured by nonmortgage ABS and a fee of 20 basis points 
was applied to TALF loans backed by CMBS collateral (Ashcraft et al., 2012). 
Structurally, the TALF was one of the more complicated programs implemented by the Fed 
and it required several parties to assess values of collateral, eligibility of borrowers, and to 
manage the loans during their tenure. The FRBNY, the Fed entity responsible for managing 
the TALF, employed other parties in the process: 
• TALF Agents—Primary dealers or other designated agents who handled 
certain administrative activities between the FRBNY and the borrowers. 
Agents paid TALF loan principal and interest from the proceeds of collateral 
sales and paid the excess to the borrower.  
• Bank of New York Mellon—program custodian that held collateral and verified 
pricing and rating for submitted collateral. 
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• Collateral monitors provided data and modeling services used in risk 
assessments and also validated collateral pricing and ratings. 
• A special purpose vehicle (SPV), TALF LLC, was established in connection with 
the TALF to hold any collateral surrendered by a borrower with respect to a 
TALF loan. The FRBNY was the beneficiary of TALF LLC, and assets of the SPV 
were consolidated onto its books. The SPV would in turn enter into loans with 
eligible companies wishing to purchase eligible collateral that it held. The Fed 
also loaned funds to TALF LLC for administrative costs. All such loans were 
secured by the assets of TALF LLC.  
COP Inquiry and Review 
On March 29, 2009, Elizabeth Warren, who had recently been appointed to head the 
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP)7, sent a letter to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke 
questioning the impact on the Fed of acquiring these “illiquid” assets, the risks that it was 
undertaking, the use of indirect investment vehicles, and other matters relating to the TALF 
including reliance on the credit rating agencies to evaluate collateral. On April 1, 2009, the 
Fed responded with a 13-page, single spaced letter: Fed COP Response. (Also see the related 
Wall Street Journal article, Rappaport 2009B.) 
In its May 2009 report evaluating the TALF, the COP identified several potential problems 
with the TALF’s design and with market conditions that might damper the facility’s appeal 
to its intended participants. These included: 
• Some investors were prohibited by regulation from borrowing to purchase 
ABS. 
• Some traditional ABS investors were weak. 
• A mismatch of loan terms to the terms of collateral (at least originally). 
• Interest rates under TALF were unproven in the market. The cost of TALF 
borrowings were greater than other Fed loan programs. 
• Uncertainty about the applicability of executive compensation and foreign 
worker restrictions (originally proposed to apply then removed). 
• Confusion as to TALF Terms and Conditions. 
• Risk of political action.  
(COP Report 2009).  
________________________________________________________________ 
7 The Congressional Oversight Panel was created as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
and is charged with reviewing the state of the financial markets and regulatory system and submitting 
regular reports to Congress. The panel was to issue regular reports to congress regarding “oversight of the 
Treasury Secretary’s use of contracting authority program administration; the impact of TARP purchases on 
financial markets and financial institutions; transparency; and the effectiveness of foreclosure mitigation 








The COP concluded that “the TALF cannot be the primary means to stimulate credit for small 
business and family borrowing. Moreover, its shift of liability to the taxpayer remains an 
important policy issue and requires that the TALF operate in a carefully monitored and fully 
transparent way” (Ibid., 2009). 
Media reports also indicated that some potential TALF investors and issuers “balked” at 
certain TALF loan terms, such as one that was thought to give the Fed “too much power to 
look at their books and to reject them from the program.” Discussions with market 
participants may have also contributed to changes in some key terms of the TALF (Rappaport 
2009A). 
5. TALF Collateral 
Over the course of its tenure there would be three categories of acceptable collateral under 
the TALF, each with its own eligibility requirements: (1) Nonmortgage backed ABS, (2) 
newly-issued CMBS, and (3) Legacy CMBS. See Figure 5 for summary details of the eligibility 
requirements for each category.  
Nonmortgage-backed ABS 
At inception, in November 2008, the original collateral that was accepted under the TALF 
was U.S.-dollar-denominated ABS that were secured by a variety of consumer and business 
loans originated on or after January 1, 2009: 
• retail auto loans; 
• federally guaranteed and private student loans; 
• credit card receivables; 
• small-business loans, fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the U.S. 
government, originated under the Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) 
7(a) (“Pool Certificates”) and 504 (“Development Company Participation 
Certificates”) programs. 
(Fed. Res. PR Nov. 25, 2008; Ashcraft et al, 2012).  
On March 19, 2008, the Fed held the first TALF auction and loaned $5.7 billion. On that day 
it also announced that the TALF eligible collateral would expand to include ABS backed by 
loans related to:  
• commercial, rental car company, and government fleet leases; 
• business equipment loans and leases; 
• floorplan loans, by which, for example, auto dealers finance inventories; 
• servicing advance receivables, which arise from residential mortgage-
servicing advances. 
(Fed. Res. PR March 19, 2009). 
On May 1, 2009, the Fed again expanded the categories of TALF eligible collateral to include 
securities backed by: 
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• insurance premium finance loans, by which businesses finance lump-sum 
insurance premium payments. 
(Fed. Res. PR May 1, 2009).  
 
Figure 5: Overview of TALF-Eligible Collateral 
 
 
aAsset-backed securities (ABS) must have an average life of five years or less. 
bMust refinance maturing ABS through 2010:Q1 or be new master trust with originations after January 
1, 2009. Eligible premium finance ABS may also be issued out of an existing or newly established master 
trust in which all or substantially all of the underlying exposures were originated on or after January 1, 
2009. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
 
Requirements 
Eligible ABS had to have a credit rating in the highest investment-grade rating category 
(AAA) from two or more approved major rating agencies8, and could not have received a 
credit rating below the highest investment grade rating category from a major rating agency 
________________________________________________________________ 
8 Only ratings from Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Investors Service, or Standard & Poor’s were acceptable. After 
criticism from the COP, the Fed expanded the number of acceptable rating agencies for CMBS adding Realpoint 
and DBRS and also adopted a rule as to how it would qualify agencies. Also see discussion at page 16.  
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(PR Nov. 25, 2008). The rating had to be attained on the strength of the securitized assets 
and structure and not because of a financial guarantee or “wrap” provided by an insurance 
company (Ashcraft et al. 2012). At least ninety-five percent of the credit exposures 
underlying the eligible collateral had to be incurred by U.S. obligors.  
The original list of collateral was narrowly drawn and significantly, excluded previously 
issued ABS as the intent was to stimulate new lending. Synthetic ABS were also excluded 
because some of these more highly-structured bonds had been shown to have obscured the 
risks associated with the underlying assets. Also excluded was ABS that contained 
underlying assets that the issuer had originated.  
TALF borrowers were not required to post additional collateral if the value of their posted 
collateral declined during the term of the loan. And substitutions of collateral were not 
permitted. 
As shown in Figure 6, TALF loans secured by nonmortgage ABS would amount to $59 billion 
(out of a total of $71 billion), the overwhelming majority of loans issued under the facility. 
The last TALF auction was held in March 2010. 
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Figure 6: TALF Loans by Subscription and Asset Class (Millions of Dollars, Except as Noted) 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. (Ashcraft et al. 2012). 
 
Expansion of the TALF Commitment  
On February 10, even before the first auction was held, the Fed and Treasury Department 
jointly announced a willingness to commit as much as $1 trillion to the TALF program and 
to expand the acceptable categories of collateral. The expansion was supported by additional 
funds from the Treasury Department pursuant to the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(approved in October 2008). The expanded TALF was incorporated as a key element of The 
Consumer and Business Lending Initiative, a “multipronged effort to unlock credit markets 
in the U.S. economy” adopted by the Treasury Department. (See Treasury 2009.) Specifically, 
the TALF was to “provide additional assistance to financial markets and institutions in 
meeting the credit needs of households and businesses and thus to support overall economic 
growth in the current period of severe financial strains” (Fed. Res. PR Feb. 10, 2009).  
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At the original announcement of the TALF, the Fed also indicated that it might later expand 
eligible asset classes to include commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), non-Agency 
residential mortgage-backed securities, or other asset classes (Fed. Res. PR Nov. 25, 2008). 
A TALF white paper issued by the Treasury Department (March 3, 2009) revealed that 
several other classes of assets were indeed being analyzed and evaluated whether and how 
they might be added to the TALF. The focus was on “including securities that will have the 
greatest macroeconomic impact and that could most efficiently be added to the TALF at a 
low and manageable risk to the government” (Treasury 2009). 
The asset classes that ultimately were added to the TALF are discussed below. Also 
considered but not added to TALF eligible collateral were private label residential mortgage 
backed securities, collateralized loan and debt obligations, and other ABS not included in the 
initial rollout (Ibid.).  
Newly-issued CMBS 
On May 1, 2009, the Fed further expanded the TALF-eligible collateral to include newly-
issued CMBS; the first subscription was to occur in June. At the same time the Fed also 
authorized five-year loans (up to $100 billion) to purchase newly-issued CMBS, and ABS 
backed by student loans and by SBA loans. Extension to the five-year term brought TALF 
loan maturities closer to the longer average maturities of these types of securities.  
Eligible CMBS had to be privately issued, structurally senior AAA-rated tranches secured by 
first-lien, fixed-rate amortizing commercial real estate loans originated on or after January 
1, 2009, that bore a fixed interest rate (Ashcraft et al. 2012). Like nonmortgage ABS, the 
rating had to be attained on the strength of the securitization collateral and the structure 
itself and could not rely on a financial guarantee or “wrap” provided by an insurance 
company or third party (Ibid., 44).  
The first subscription of the new-issue CMBS program was offered in June 2009 and the last 
in June 2010. The demand for this type of borrowing never materialized, and only one TALF-
eligible newly-issued CMBS subscription was closed, in November 2009 for $72.2 million. 
Since the purchase price factored into the determination of the loan amount, borrowers had 
to have purchased the legacy CMBS in recent secondary-market transactions between 
unaffiliated parties, executed on an arm’s-length basis at prevailing market prices. The 
FRBNY would independently review and reject any CMBS that did not meet the stated 
criteria or which otherwise posed “unacceptable risk” (Fed. Res. PR May 19, 2009). 
The objective of the expansion to include legacy CMBS was to restart the market for legacy 
securities and, by doing so, stimulate the extension of new credit by helping to ease balance 
sheet pressures on banks and other financial institutions. It was postulated that by 
“promot[ing] price discovery and liquidity of legacy CMBS” the improvement in the market 
would “facilitate the issuance of new-issue CMBS, thereby helping borrowers finance new 
purchases of commercial properties or refinance existing commercial mortgages on better 
terms” (Ibid.). 
Expanding the TALF to include legacy CMBS was controversial at the Fed. Transcripts show 
that several members balked at taking on what many in the market considered “a 
euphemism for asset-backed instruments created during the boom that had become toxic” 
and felt that “Funding the bad bank is a close cousin to being the bad bank” (Morgenson 
2015). However, the Fed staff considered that stimulating a market for such securities would 
propel their prices and help bolster bank balance sheets (Ibid.).  
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On August 17, 2009, the Fed announced that it was holding in abeyance any further 
expansion of collateral types, and no further expansion of the TALF-eligible collateral types 
occurred.  
Legacy CMBS proved fairly attractive as collateral and as shown in Figure 6, loans secured 
by legacy CMBS became a sizeable amount of TALF landings, totaling $12 billion of the $71 
billion total lent under the program. The last legacy CMBS subscription was held March 2010. 
6. Features of the TALF Designed to Minimize Risk 
From its origination there was controversy that the TALF required the Fed to acquire and 
hold securities of broader types than the high-quality collateral that it usually accepted at its 
discount window and Open market operations. The TALF assets also had maturities of longer 
duration than usually held by the Fed. TALF loans were collateralized but were issued on a 
non-recourse basis. If a borrower failed to repay the loan, the Fed would retain the collateral, 
but if it was insufficient to cover the amounts owed, the Fed had no recourse to the borrower. 
In designing the TALF, the Fed incorporated a number of features designed to mitigate these 
risks. 
Haircuts  
All TALF collateral was subject to a haircut, which is a type of risk-sharing because the lender 
does not receive the full-benefit of the market value of the collateral. By applying a haircut, 
the Fed had a cushion to protect itself if the borrower defaults or if the collateral decreases 
in value. Haircuts were applied to all collateral securing the TALF loans and ranged from 5% 
to 16% based on the quality of the assets. Examples include: 
• A 5% haircut was applied to student loans and SBA loans guaranteed by the 
government with maturities of 1-5 years.  
• A haircut of 9% was applied to subprime auto loans with one-year maturity. 
For similar loans with a four-to-five-year maturity, a 13% haircut applied.  
• For all CMBS with maturities of five years or less, a 15% haircut applied.  
See Appendix C for a detailed listing of TALF haircuts.  
In responding to the COP’s inquiry, the Fed stated that the haircuts were risk-based, that it 
had “chosen the haircuts to exceed the losses in value likely in nearly all future outcomes,” 
and that “[in] recognition of the fact that the current economic situation is extraordinary and 
the outlook is especially uncertain, our economists made very conservative assumptions in 
calibrating the program’s haircuts” (Fed COP Response 2009).  
Treasury Underwriting  
From origination until January 15, 2013, the Treasury Department committed $20 billion in 
backup funding from the TARP, to the TALF LLC providing credit protection to the FRBNY. If 
a TALF loan was not repaid and the proceeds could not be recouped through sale of the 
collateral, the Treasury Department would bear the next losses, after the borrower’s haircut, 
up to $20 billion, beyond which the Federal Reserve would bear any further losses (Ashcraft 
et al. 2012).  
In July 2010, when the program was closed to new lending, the Treasury Department’s 
commitment was reduced to $4.3 billion to reflect the fact that only $43 billion of TALF loans 
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were outstanding. After January 15, 2013, the TALF LLC became self-funding through the 
income and appreciation for the securities held, and the Treasury back-up funding was no 
longer needed.  
Required Credit Ratings  
All TALF collateral had to have the highest rating, AAA (or the equivalent), from two 
designated nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO) and could not be 
rated less by any such agency. Originally Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s, or 
Fitch Ratings were the acceptable NRSROs for nonmortgage ABS. For newly-issued CMBS, 
eligible NRSROs also included Realpoint and DBRS (Fed. Res. PR May 19, 2009). The rating 
could not be achieved through the reliance on a financial guarantee from a third party or a 
“wrap” from an insurance company but had to be attained on the strength of the security’s 
underlying assets and structure.  
The credibility of rating agencies had come under attack as the subprime mortgages and 
related securities were downgraded. The issue of the reliability of the ratings was also raised 
in the COP’s Letter.9 As a result, on October 5, 2009, the Fed proposed a new rule creating a 
new process for determining NRSROs that were acceptable to rate TALF collateral (Fed. Res. 
PR Oct. 5, 2009). The rule was adopted on December 4, 2009, and required NRSROs to 
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission and demonstrate experience in 
issuing credit ratings specific to the types of assets accepted as collateral under the TALF 
(Fed. Res. PR Dec. 4, 2009). With the February 2010 subscription, DBRS became an eligible 
rating agency for nonmortgage ABS (Ashcraft et al. 2012). 
Independent Auditor Verification 
Each ABS issuer of TALF collateral also had to have an external auditor provide an opinion 
that management’s assertions concerning key collateral eligibility requirements were fairly 
stated in material respects. The Fed asserted that this “attestation provide[ed] a high level 
of assurance concerning TALF collateral eligibility requirements” (Fed COP Response). 
Internal Risk Assessment 
When the Fed announced that it would begin accepting CMBS as eligible TALF collateral it 
also stated that it would begin conducting internal risk assessments of all such assets 
delivered. This assessment was likely driven by the unreliable history of certain mortgage-
related securities and presumably would provide the basis for the Fed exercising its right to 
reject any CMBS, or individual underlying loans, as not meeting eligibility requirements or 
as presenting an “unacceptable risk” (Fed. Res. PR May 19, 2009). 
The risk assessments for CMBS were more intensive than those of nonmortgage ABS but both 
relied on the issuers providing all data regarding the ABS or CMBS and the underlying 
exposures that had been provided to any NRSRO well in advance of the TALF subscription 
date for which the collateral was proposed to be used. For CMBS the Fed analyzed not just 
the underlying asset pool and trust structure, but also key documents (Ashcraft et al. 2012). 
________________________________________________________________ 
9 “Consistent failures of the credit rating agencies were a significant factor in the sales of risky mortgage-backed 
securities that helped produce the current financial crisis. In light of these failures, please explain why reliance 
on credit ratings for the TALF is a reasonable basis on which to protect the taxpayers, regardless of the number 
of credit-ratings agencies whose opinions are required” (Fed COP Response, Item 8.) 
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Beginning with the November 2009 subscription, the FRBNY also conducted a formal risk 
assessment with respect to nonmortgage ABS collateral delivered for TALF loans. This 
assessment was designed to ensure that bonds pledged to TALF met three general standards: 
1. Credit quality: The bond is of the highest credit quality with de minimis risk of 
default and a low probability of a material deterioration in credit quality.  
2. Transparency: Sufficient information is available to allow investors to make 
informed judgments about the credit risk of the collateral underlying the bond as 
well as the level of due diligence on the collateral performed by the issuer.  
3. Simplicity of structure: The relationship between the performance of the 
underlying collateral and bond payments is clear and uncomplicated (Fed. Res. PR 
Oct. 5, 2009). (Also see Appendix B.) 
7. Usage and Impact of the TALF 
In aggregate, the Fed issued 2,152 loans, totally $71.1 billion, under the TALF. The volume of 
outstanding loans peaked in March 2010 at $48.2 billion. The one subscription against 
newly-issued CMBS occurred in March 2009 for $ 72.2 million. Loans secured by 
nonmortgage ABS totaled $59 billion and loans secured by legacy CMBS totaled $12 billion 
(Ashcraft et al. 2012, 57).  
TALF usage grew gradually as shown in Figure 6. Despite supposed pent-up volume, only 
$4.7 billion was subscribed to in the first lending in March 2009. This was followed by totals 
of $1.7 billion, $10.9 billion, and $11.5 billion in April, May, and June respectively. The Fed 
termed the trend a “sign of sustained interest after a slow start” (Lanman and Mulholland 
2009). 
Utilization was sustained and even increased as TALF-eligible asset classes were expanded. 
However, overall, utilization of the TALF would stall well below the intended levels of the 
Fed and Treasury; the aggregate of loans did not even reach one half of the originally 
committed $200 billion. Ashcraft concludes that the low level of usage of the TALF can be 
attributed to two things (1) the stringent risk mitigators built into the facility to protect the 
public and (2) the rapid improvement in market conditions for the ABS and CMBS markets 
(Ashcraft et al. 2012). As discussed above, however, the COP and various investors and 
issuers also felt that certain design elements of the TALF, and market factors, were not 
particularly conducive to robust utilization of the facility.  
The original expiration date for the TALF, December 31, 2009, was extended to March 31, 
2010, for loans against ABS and legacy CMBS, and until June 30, 2010, for loans against 
newly-issued CMBS. The last outstanding TALF loan matured on October 29, 2014. TALF LLC 
was terminated on November 2014 after distributing accumulated fees and income to the 
Treasury (90%) and FRBNY (10%). 
Impact of the TALF on the Securitization Markets 
Despite the lower than expected subscription levels and low volume of usage, the TALF has 
been credited with succeeding in its objective of providing liquidity to the securitization 
market and helping it to restart. As early as June 2009, the Fed reported that the program 
was “working as designed” and that there were signs that the issuance of consumer ABS 
securities “has been gradually reviving.” March saw four deals totaling $8.3 billion come to 
market, followed by four in April ($2.9 billion) and eight in May ($13.6 billion). And in June, 
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13 deals worth $16.4 billion closed. These numbers were a long way from the $200 billion 
per year in new issuances experienced in recent years but were seen as a “good start,” 
especially because TALF-eligible deals accounted for only about half of the new issuances. 
“This means that the TALF is helping to restart the market rather than the TALF being the 
market” (Dudley 2009). 
In November 2009, it was reported that a total of $134 billion in new ABS had been issued 
during the year and that two-thirds of them had been assisted with TALF loans (Shrivastava 
2009). Perhaps, more importantly, there were already implications in the market that the 
ABS market had “sufficiently recovered from last year’s credit crisis that issuer and investors 
again could interact directly with one another” (Ibid.). (Also see Figure 7 for changes in the 
ABS secondary Market Spreads.)  
By March 2010, the TALF was being termed “[O]ne of the Federal Reserve’s most successful 
financial rescue programs” and being praised for having “worked so well” (Ellis 2010). The 
program was said to “have done what it was supposed to: rekindle demand and get credit 
flowing again” (Shrivastava 2010). That month more than $21 billion in ABS supported by 
student, auto, and credit card loans were issued, two-thirds without the support of the TALF. 
Moreover, Tom Deutsch, Executive Director of the American Securitization Forum 
commented that there seemed to be evidence of a “pretty significant shift from TALF-eligible 
deals to non-TALF, which is a pretty strong signal that the market has returned to near 
normal levels” (Ellis 2010). 
This was exactly the type of trend that the Fed had hoped the TALF would spark. In May 2010 
the Fed reported favorably on the TALF’s impact on the ABS markets: 
Nonetheless, market reactions to the announcement of the emergency facilities, 
anecdotal evidence, and a number of the studies we do have suggest that the facilities 
forestalled potentially much worse outcomes and encouraged improvements. For 
example, some asset-backed securities (ABS) spreads, such as those for consumer 
ABS and commercial mortgage-backed securities, narrowed significantly following 
the creation of the TALF, and activity in ABS markets has picked up. While the overall 
improvement in the economic outlook has no doubt contributed to the improvement 
in ABS markets, it does appear that the TALF helped to buoy the availability of credit 
to firms and households and thus supported economic activity. Indeed, following the 
kick-start from the TALF, a number of these markets are now operating without any 
governmental backing. (Kohn 2010)   
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Figure 7: Consumer ABS Secondary Market Spreads Have Narrowed from Their Historically 
High Levels Reached in the Fourth Quarter of 2008 
 
Source: COP Report, 47. 
 
As might be expected, after announcement, spreads improved for classes of assets eligible 
for TALF funding. However, researchers also found that shortly thereafter, spreads also 
improved for non-eligible classes of assets. 
It is also interesting to note that the Fed has favorably characterized the TALF as an 
important, new and necessary type of liquidity response for it in its central banker role. It 
justified its support for market-based credit intermediation, as opposed to traditional 
banking sector support, by citing the key and sizeable role that securitization had come to 
play in the economy. While recognizing that legislative changes might limit its ability to 
implement another TALF, the Fed expressed commitment to the idea that “[it] should be 
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APPENDIX A: Events in the TALF Program 





November 25, 2008 Initial Program Announcement 
March 19, 2009 First new-issue asset-backed security (ABS) subscription 
March 19, 2009 Expansion to equipment, servicing advance, fleet lease, nonauto floorplan 
 
March 19, 2009 Joint U.S. Treasury/Federal reserve announcement of expansion of TALF to up to 
$1 trillion and plans to study inclusion of legacy commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS) and residential mortgage-backed securities  
May 1, 2009 Expansion to new-issue CMBS and insurance premium receivables 
May 1, 2009 Announcement of the five-year TALF loans, carry cap 
May 16, 2009 First new-issue CMBS subscription 
May 19, 2009 Expansion to legacy CMBS 
July 16, 2009 First legacy CMBS subscription 
November 3, 2009 First ABS subscription applying Fed Credit risk assessment 
November 17, 2009 First TALF-eligible new-issue CMBS deal 
March 4, 2010 Last ABS subscription date 
March 19, 2010 Last legacy CMBS subscription date 
June 18, 2010 Last new-issue CMBS subscription date 
July 20, 2010 Reduction of TARP capital in TALF LLC 
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APPENDIX B: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Risk Assessment Principles for 
Nonmortgage-Backed ABS 
 
The purpose of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s risk assessment process is 
to ensure that bonds pledged to TALF meet three general standards. 
1. Credit quality: The bond is of the highest credit quality with de minimis risk of 
default and a low probability of a material deterioration in credit quality.  
2. Transparency: Sufficient information is available to allow investors to make 
informed judgments about the credit risk of the collateral underlying the bond as 
well as the level of due diligence on the collateral performed by the issuer.  
3. Simplicity of structure: The relationship between the performance of the 
underlying collateral and bond payments is clear and uncomplicated.  
In determining whether a proposed transaction satisfies each of the principles 
above, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York recognizes that appropriate 
structural and transactional features may differ significantly across asset 
categories. Within an asset category, however, bonds will be reviewed relative to 
generally accepted prudent market practices in the areas of credit support; issuer 
and servicer strength; underwriting; diversification (geographic, borrower, or 
other); and simplicity of structure.  
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York will identify transactions that may not meet 
these standards and, in as timely a manner as possible, alert the issuer of specific 
concerns.  








Appendix C: Collateral Haircuts for Nonmortgage-Backed ABS Collateral Under TALF   
ABS Average Life (years) 
Sector Subsector 0-<1 1-<2 2-<3 3-<4 4-<5 5-<6 6-<7 
Auto Prime retail lease 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 
  
Auto Prime retail loan 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
  
Auto Subprime retail loan 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 
  
Auto Motorcycle/ 
other recreational vehicles 
7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 
  
Auto Commercial and government fleets 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 
  
Auto Rental fleets 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 
  
Credit Card Prime 5% 5% 6% 7% 8% 
  
Credit Card Subprime 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
  
Equipment Loans and Leases  5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 
  
Floorplan Auto 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 
  
Floorplan Non-Auto 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
  
Premium Finance Property and casualty 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 
  
Servicing Advances Residential mortgages 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 
  
Small Business  SBA Loans  5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 
Student Loan Private 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 
Student Loan Gov’t guaranteed 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 
Notes: For ABS benefitting from a substantial government guarantee with average lives of five years and beyond, haircuts will 
increase by one percentage point for every two additional years (or portion thereof) of average life at or beyond five years. For 
all other ABS with average lives of five years and beyond, haircuts will increase by one percentage point for each additional year 
(or portion thereof) of average life at or beyond five years. 
The collateral haircut for each newly issued CMBS with an average life of five years or less will be 15%. For newly issued CMBS 
with average lives beyond five years, collateral haircuts will increase by one percentage point for each additional year (or portion 
thereof) of average life beyond five years. No CMBS may have an average life beyond ten years.  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York: http://www.newyorkfed.org//markets/talf_faq.html#10 
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